Abstract: Some expressions, such as "all" and "might", must be interpreted differently, relative to a single context, when embedded under "says that" than when unembedded.
1 EHW want to say that a sentence expresses the same "proposition" in every context but that "the truth-value of that proposition is contextually variable" (2005, p. 154) . But the varieties of context-relativity they actually discuss are very limited -only those that they want to redesign as relativity to points of evaluation. For instance, they do not discuss demonstratives, or the contextrelativity of quantifiers, or standards for comparative adjectives. Perhaps they think that all of these are determined by the choice of world, time and agent. Alternatively, they might be prepared to build additional parameters into the n-tuples that propositions are supposed to be sets of, or they might be prepared to say that in other respects even the expression of centered-worlds propositions may be relative to a context.
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Page 6 suppose that Moriarty's utterance of (1) Likewise, we may suppose that Watson's utterance of (2) is true. (EHW have "believes" in place of "says" in their version of (2), p. 155.)
The problem is that on a certain plausible understanding of "might" and a certain understanding of indirect discourse, (2) seems to be false. We may assume that "might"-sentences such as (1) are to be evaluated relative to contexts that specify domains of possibilities of some kind.
2
(1), then, is true in the context that pertains to Moriarty's utterance of it, since there is a possibility in the set of possibilities specified by that context such that Holmes is in Paris in that possibility. But the context that pertains to
Moriarty's utterance of (1) is different from the context that pertains to Watson's utterance of (2). Since Holmes is right there in front of Watson in London, the set of 2 EHW and Egan call the kind of "might"-sentence they are interested in epistemic modals. I myself am not so sure that there is a special class of sentences or modal operators that deserve to be called "epistemic". Rather, it may be that every sentence of the form "It might be that p" is true or false only relative to a contextually determined set of possibilities. In some conversations, the context that pertains to that conversation determines a set of possibilities comprising all and only those that are compatible with what the speaker knows or with what any member of a certain set of people, including perhaps the speaker, knows (so that a possibility is not included if there is someone in the set such that it is incompatible with what he or she knows). But on other occasions, the context pertinent to a conversation will determine a set of possibilities in a different way. For instance, it might be the set of possibilities compatible with the interlocutors' carrying out some plan that they have made ("We might wait until next week to get started") or the set of possibilities compatible with their conforming to some rules they have laid down ("We might vote on this before the committee reports").
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possibilities pertinent to Watson's utterance presumably does not contain a possibility in which Holmes is in Paris. And likewise, we should not say that Moriarty said that there was such a possibility in that domain of possibilities. But if we take the domain of possibilities relative to which we evaluate the "that"-clause in (2) to be those that are pertinent to Watson, then, apparently , that is what we will interpret (2) as saying Moriarty said. So (2) will be false.
As relativists, EHW and Egan propose to avoid this result by taking the proposition a sentence expresses to be a centered-worlds proposition. Since the proposition that is expressed by the sentence that follows the "that"-clause contains not only triples 〈w, t, i〉 in which the center i is the speaker but also triples 〈w, t, i〉 in which i is the person to whom an act of saying is attributed, there is supposed to be the possibility of defining the saying-relation in such a way that what Watson's utterance of (2) means is that Moriarty said that for at least one of the possibilities pertinent to Moriarty (not Watson) Holmes is in Paris (EHW 2005, p. 158; Egan 2007, p. 9) . The basic idea is that (somehow) the relativist can allow that the utterance of (2) is evaluated from the point of view of the speaker of (2) by deciding how the attributee, the subject of (2), Moriarty, evaluated the utterance of (1) from his point of view.
Actually, I am not at all confident that what EHW and Egan say even makes good sense. While I am focusing on "says", EHW and Egan focus on "believes". What EHW say about belief sentences is this:
When one says that a believes that b might be F, one says that a believes the proposition b might be F. And a believes that proposition iff a believes it is consistent with what they know that b is F. (2005, p. 158) And what Egan says is this:
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When I believe that it might be that P, I believe something about my particular situation relative to the evidence-namely, that none of the evidence that's within my epistemic reach rules out P. (2007, p. 9 ).
But as far as I can see, EHW and Egan have given us no clear basis for these conclusions.
Since Egan's solo paper is more explicit in its analysis of "might"-sentences, I will focus on what he says there.
Apparently, Egan thinks the account of belief expressed in the above quotations follows from three premises:
(i) His account of "might": "It might be the case that p" is true relative to a centered world 〈w, t, i〉 iff it's compatible with everything that's within i's epistemic reach at t in w that p (p. 8).
(ii) His relativistic conception of propositions: Propositions are sets of centered worlds (p. 5).
(iii) The assumption that belief (and, I suppose, saying) is a relation between a subject and a proposition (p. 6).
From these premises it is apparently supposed to follow that S believes (says) that it might be that p if and only if S believes (says) that it is compatible with everything within his or her epistemic reach that p.
In particular, Egan needs it to be the case that (a), below, is sufficient for (b):
(a) S believes (says) that it is compatible with everything within his or her epistemic reach that p.
(b) S believes (says) that it might be that p.
If (a) is sufficient for (b), then, as desired, it will be sufficient for the truth of (2) Even when "Moriarty says that you might be in Paris" and "You might be in Paris" are evaluated with respect to a single context, it is not the case that the embedded "might" and the unembedded "might" have to be interpreted in the same way.
Nonetheless, I think that EHW, Egan and Weatherson have stumbled upon a semantic question of real interest, and I agree that it may motivate significant revisions to our conception of the semantics of natural language. Very roughly, the problem is that in some respects the "that"-clause in an indirect discourse sentence reflects the perspective of the speaker of the indirect discourse (the attributor), and in some respects it may reflect the perspective of the person to whom saying is attributed (the attributee). What the relativists are picking up on and trying to accommodate are the respects in which the "that"-clause reflects the perspective of the attributee, not the attributor. But as we will see, it is not necessary to resort to relativism to accommodate this distinction.
Contexts that Point
8/6/09 Page 11
Universal quantifiers in indirect discourse
In this paper, I do not want to try to give a semantics for "might", because that task raises all kinds of additional issues that I do not want to get into here. So let me shift to relatively straightforward quantifiers such as "every" and "everyone". Like "might" in indirect discourse, "every" in indirect discourse can reflect the perspective of the attributee, as opposed to that of the attributor. But moreover, the attributor can add clarificatory modifiers to the quantifier, and this fact too needs to be accommodated in our semantics.
Suppose that Silas is at the birthday party of his friend Jonas. Silas's sister Emma is at a different birthday party for a friend of her own. The party for Emma's friend is a bit listless; so Emma calls Silas on her cell phone to see how things are going where he is. Silas is having a great time and tells Emma excitedly, "There's a clown here; he's making animal shapes with balloons!" Emma turns to her friend Dottie, who is also getting a bit bored and says, (3) Silas says that there's a clown there.
What Emma does not say to Dottie is, (4) *Silas says that there's a clown here.
So the words that follow "that" in Emma's utterance are not quite the words that Silas uttered. Emma substitutes "there" for Silas's own "here".
The next thing Silas says is "Everybody is a wearing a funny hat!" Emma turns to Dottie and says, What the example suggests is that here/there and everybody are different sorts of cases. In Emma's report to Dottie about Silas's saying about the clown, she has to substitute "there" for Silas's "here". In other words, the sentence that follows "that" has to be altered to reflect her own point of view, or the context pertinent to her conversation with Dottie. But in Emma's report to Dottie about Silas's saying about the funny hats, Emma does not need to substitute anything for Silas's "everybody" to reflect her own point of view, although she may do so for greater clarity. So it seems we can say at least this: There are two kinds of context-relativities, those that require adjustment to the speaker's context in indirect discourse ("here" being adjusted to "there") and those that do not require adjustment to the speaker's context ("everybody" remaining as it is).
That we need to say something a little more complex than this becomes apparent when we consider how a speaker may modify the quantifier in case she chooses to modify it for clarity. One thing the speaker may do is "precisely subclassify the universal domain." What I mean by that is that if the attributee's actual words are of the form, "Every F is G" and the set of FH-things in the whole world equals the set of FH-things in Thus, we add the words "piece of pottery" to his "every". But the phrase "every piece of pottery" does not precisely subclassify the universal domain, because the set of pieces of pottery (in the whole world) is not equal to the set of pieces of pottery in the domain pertinent to Julian's utterance, which is confined to the pottery in his collection. Or suppose that Mary is the chair of a committee at her workplace. At the start of the meeting, she looks around and declares, "Everyone is present." Later, one of Mary's coworker's, may correctly assert, 
A semantics for indirect discourse, informally
For purposes of formulating a semantics of indirect discourse, we may conceive of a for S in c. Moreover, we will want to define a relation between sentences such that "S said that p" will be true in a context c only if there is a sentence in the utterance domain for S in c such that that relation holds in c between p and the sentence uttered. Whether that relation holds in c will depend on the content of c and, in particular, will depend on the content of the context determined for S by c. Let us call this relation, still to be
defined, elevation to c from c(S). So we may say that one sentence is an elevation of another sentence to c from c(S).
As I said at the start of section 1, our theory of language will include an account of the conditions under which a context pertains to a given utterance. We may impose as a condition that a context must meet in order to count as the context that pertains to an utterance that for each agent S to whom the context assigns an utterance domain, the sentences in the utterance domain assigned to S must be sentences that S has actually uttered. A further condition on c's pertaining will be that the context determined for a speaker S by c must be the context that pertains to S's utterances of the sentences in the utterance domain for S. (For simplicity, then, I am assuming that only a single context pertains to all of those utterances. In a fuller account, we might wish to allow that a speaker is associated with various sets of utterances, each associated with its own context.)
Putting these devices together, we may say that "S says that p" is true in a context c if and only if there is a sentence q such that q belongs to the utterance domain for S in c and p is an elevation of q to c from S(c). In view of the stated conditions on pertaining, this implies that an utterance of "S says that p" will be true (simpliciter) only if S uttered a sentence q such that p is an elevation of q to the context pertaining to that utterance of In these terms, here is how we can account for the fact that sentence (3), "Silas says that there's a clown there", is true in the context pertinent to Emma's utterance of it (Emma's context), and thus for the fact that Emma's utterance of (3) is true (simpliciter).
First, we may suppose that Silas's utterance of "There's a clown here" belongs to the utterance domain for Silas in Emma's context, since Silas did utter that sentence.
Second, we may suppose that the sentence "There's a clown there" is an elevation of "There's a clown here" to Emma's context from the context that Emma's context assigns to Silas. The basis for this assumption will be the fact that the place that "there" refers to in Emma's context is the place that "here" refers to in the context that Emma's context assigns to Silas. So the sentence (3), "Silas said that there's a clown there" is true in Emma's context, because the sentence "There's a clown here" is in the utterance domain for Silas in that context and "There's a clown there" is an elevation of the sentence "There's a clown here" to Emma's context from the context that Emma's context assigns to Silas. Since Emma's context is the context that pertains to her utterance of (3) and (3) is true in that context, her utterance of (3) is true.
Similarly, but even more simply, we can account for the fact that (5), "Silas says that everybody is wearing a funny hat", is true in the context that pertains to Emma's utterance. "Silas says that everybody is wearing a funny hat" is true in Emma's context, because "Everybody is wearing a funny hat" belongs to the utterance domain for Silas in that context and "Everybody is wearing a funny hat" is an elevation of itself to Emma's
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context from the context that Emma's context assigns to Silas. Likewise, (6), "Silas says that everybody at Jonas's party is wearing a funny hat", is true in the context that pertains to Emma's utterance, because "Everybody is wearing a funny hat" is in the utterance domain for Silas in that context and "Everybody at Jonas's party is wearing a funny hat", we may suppose, is an elevation of "Everybody is wearing a funny hat" to Emma's context from the context that Emma's context assigns to Silas. Both (5) and (6) can be true in the context that pertains to Emma's utterance, because "Everyone is wearing a funny hat" is in the utterance domain that Emma's context assigns to Silas, and there are two different sentences that are both elevations of that sentence to Emma's context from the context that Emma's context assigns to Silas.
Often, whether one sentence is an elevation of another to c from c(S) will depend both on the contents of c(S) and on other elements of c. For example, the reason why "There's a clown there" is an elevation of "There's a clown here" to Emma's context from the context that Emma's context assigns to Silas is that there is a single location a, such that Emma's context assigns a to "there" and the context that Emma's context assigns to Silas assigns a to "here". Likewise, to explain the qualifications that may be added to a quantifier in indirect discourse, as in (6), (7) and (8), we need to define the elevation relation in a way that makes reference to both the context pertinent to the attributor's utterance and the context that that context assigns to the attributee, as I will presently explain.
Toward defining the pertinent principle of elevation, let us stipulate that every context contains a domain of discourse. I will suppose that, strictly speaking, the members of domains of discourse are singular terms, not objects such as terms might be I contend that the following principle of elevation holds:
(S) if and only if both of the following conditions hold: (i) For every term t in D c(S) , if "t is F" is true in c(S) then "t is FH" is true in both c and c(S).
(
ii) For every term t in D c , if "t is FH" is true in c, then "t is FH" is true in c(S).
What condition (i) says, loosely speaking, is that everything in the domain of c(S) that is
F in c(S) is FH in both c and c(S). Satisfaction of condition (i) implies that the set of F-
speaking, is that everything in the domain of c that is FH in c is FH in c(S). (This principle of elevation will fail in the case where H itself contains terms, such as "there", that may be the products of elevation. But I will ignore that complication.)
In light of this detail regarding the elevation relation, we can understand the truth conditions of sentences (7) and (8). Let us focus just on (8), "Mary said that everyone
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working on a graphic interface was present". I will adjust tenses as needed without further comment. Sentence (8) is true in the context that pertains to the co-worker's utterance of that sentence, call it c, because the sentence "Everyone is present" is in the utterance domain that c assigns to Mary and, as I will explain presently, "Everyone working on a graphic interface was present" is an elevation of "Everyone is present" to c from c("Mary").
Condition (i) is satisfied, because (we may suppose) the domain of discourse for c("Mary") consists of (terms denoting) members of the committee that she chairs, and for each of them it is true in that context, as well as in c, that he or she is working on a graphic interface. (I am instantiating "Every F" with "every one".) To see the significance of this, suppose that (i) is not satisfied, because there is a member of the domain of the context c("Mary") who is not working on a graphic interface. In that case, (8) would not be true in the context pertinent to the utterance of (8) Suppose also that it is true in c that t is working on a graphic interface. But precisely because t is not in the domain of c("Mary"), it is not true in c("Mary") that t is working on a graphic interface. (The sentence "t is working on a graphic interface" will be neither true nor false in c ("Mary") .) Under these conditions we should not consider (8) to be true either, because it seems to interpret Mary as having said something about a person who is not even (denoted by any term in) the domain of discourse for the context that c assigns to her; it seems to interpret Mary has having said something about a person working on a graphic interface who was not in fact among the people that Mary was talking about.
I am not taking up here the question of how to define the elevation relation for the case of sentences in which "says that" is embedded under "says that". If the original utterance by Z was of the form "Every F is G", X may say, "Y says that Z says that every FH is G", but in this case, what amplification H may be added to the predicate F will depend on three contexts, the context pertinent to X, the context pertinent to Y, and the context pertinent to Z.
In short, my theory about indirect discourse attributions of A-form categorical sentences is that speakers have basically two options. They may simply quote, without modifying the quantifier, but making needed adjustments for words like "here" and "you". Or they may add modifiers to the quantifier. But in that case the modifier must meet certain conditions with respect to both the context pertinent to the utterance of the indirect discourse sentence and the context that that context assigns to the speaker of the 
is a special case of this second alternative.
Two kinds of expression
The examples we have considered demonstrate that a distinction may be drawn between two kinds of expression according to how they behave in indirect discourse. On the one hand, there are expressions like "here" and "there", which I will say presume wide scope.
These are expressions that need to be rewritten or replaced whenever the context pertinent to the original utterance interprets them differently than the context pertinent to the indirect discourse utterance does. On the other hand, there are expressions like "every" and "everyone", which I will say allow narrow scope. These are expressions that can be left as they were in the original utterance used in the act of speech that the indirect discourse utterance reports on, even when the value of the pertinent context parameter differs between the context pertinent to the original utterance and the context pertinent to the indirect discourse sentence that reports on that utterance.
The distinction between expressions that presume wide scope and expressions that allow narrow scope can be defined in terms of the relation of elevation. To say that an expression e presumes wide scope is to say that if p is an elevation of q to context c from context c(S) and e occurs in q, then in place of the occurrence of e in q we must have in p an expression e′ that is interpreted relative to the same value in c that e is interpreted relative to in c(S). For example, "here" presumes wide scope because an elevation of "There is a clown here" must have in place of "here" an expression, possibly "there", to
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which c assigns the same referent as the context that c(S) assigns to "here". On the other hand, to say that an expression e allows narrow scope is to say that for any pair of sentences p and q, though p is an elevation of q to c from c(S) and e occurs in q, e may occur without modification in p, regardless of the differences between c(S) and c.
Expressions that presume wide scope would include personal pronouns ("you"
and "I"), temporal indexicals and demonstratives ("now" and "then"), and indexical adjectives ("local" and "recent"). In any conversation, whether or not such expressions occur in the "that"-clause of an indirect discourse sentence uttered in that conversation, their interpretation is that which is assigned to them directly by the context that pertains to the conversation, not the interpretation that might be assigned to them indirectly by the context that that context assigns to the speaker who made the original utterance used in the speech act that the utterance of the indirect discourse sentence reports on.
(Alterations in tense may be due not to the difference between the context pertinent to the original utterance and the context pertinent to the indirect discourse utterance but due to the tense of "say" and sequence-of-tense rules.)
Expressions that allow narrow scope include expressions that are explicitly or implicitly quantificational. Explicitly quantificational expressions are quantifiers like "every", "some" and "most". Implicitly quantificational expressions are those such that when we formulate the truth conditions of sentences formed from them, we do so by quantifying over appropriate entities of some kind. "Might" and "must" are implicitly quantificational in this sense because we explicate "might" with an existential quantification over possibilities of some kind and explicate "must" with a universal way quantificational provides perhaps a clue. In the case of demonstratives that are also indexicals, there are some porous semantic rules, such as that "here" refers to the place at which the utterance takes place. (The rule does not fix an interpretation, since it says nothing about the size of the region, and it is "porous" because there are exceptions, such as when one puts one's finger on a map and says "here".) In the case of demonstratives that are not indexicals, such as "this" and "that", we can interpret distinct occurrences of those demonstratives differently within a single context (as when we say "This is bigger than this") by exploiting a variety of external cues, such as pointing and parallel structures elsewhere in "the text" (Gauker 2008) . The states of affairs that the rules for indexicals direct us to always pertain immediately to the utterance being interpreted, not some remote time or place. And the cues that we go by in deciding how to interpret a nonindexical demonstrative are always cues surrounding the execution of the current utterance.
By contrast, our means of identifying the contextually determined domains of quantification pertinent to the interpretation of in-some-way quantificational expressions is not as tightly constrained by conventions. Here we usually have little more to go by than the consideration of what domain is most relevant under the circumstances of utterance (Gauker 1997 have to choose our words in a way that takes into account both the domain of the context pertinent to the attribution and the domain of the context pertinent to the speaker's original utterance.
The paradox of indirect discourse
A semantics for indirect discourse ought to be able to tell us what is wrong with the following argument:
The paradox of indirect discourse This a "paradox" because, while the premises appear to be true in the context in which Emma is speaking, the conclusion is false in that context, and yet each of the inferences appears to be valid in the sense that it preserves truth-in-a-context. My diagnosis of the 
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There might be some temptation to say that the conclusion of the argument is not actually false relative to Emma's context. Not everybody in the domain of discourse pertinent to Emma's context is wearing a funny hat, to be sure. But in view of its provenance, as a conclusion from the argument that precedes, it might be said that even in Emma's situation, the sentence has to be evaluated with respect to "projected" values of the contextual parameters, namely, the parameters determined by Silas's situation (cf., EHW, p. 162; Weatherson 2008, p. 536) . However, I think this answer is indefensible.
For a case in which parameters may indeed be projected in this way, suppose Emma utters the following sentences:
(9) Silas says that there is a clown there. Everybody is wearing a funny hat.
In (9), we can take Emma's utterance of "Everybody is wearing a funny hat" to be part of what she says Silas says and evaluate her utterance by evaluating the sentence uttered relative to the parameters of the context pertinent to Silas. But when we are evaluating the validity of the argument from 1 and 2 to 5 in the paradox of indirect discourse, we should not evaluate the conclusion relative to a context different from the one relative to which we evaluate the premises, and the evaluation of the conclusion in that context does not call for appealing to the values that the contextual parameters have according to some other context (such as the one pertaining to Silas).
Here is what is really wrong with the argument. If 2 means that the sentence Silas uttered is true in Emma's context, then 2 is false, and, moreover, on that reading 3 does not even make sense. If 2 means that Silas's utterance is true, then 2 may be true in Emma's context, but in that case the "is" in 3 is not the "is" of identity but the "is" of predication, and what 3 says about that utterance is that it belongs to a certain type, the 
The basis for a semantics for indirect discourse
A commonplace conception of the task of semantic theory is that it has to account for our linguistic understanding. That is, it has to explain what it is we understand about a language that puts us in a position to understand any given utterance of that sentence.
My own view is that this is not a very satisfactory characterization of the job of a semantic theory, because it begs the question: What is it that we have to understand in order to understand a sentence?
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A partial conception that does not beg the question is that part of the task of a semantic theory for an expression is to enable us to define the class of logically valid arguments involving that expression. (This was the primary criterion by which I defended a semantics for conditionals in my 2005.) In the case of indirect discourse sentences, however, this test does no work since the "that"-clauses are logically completely inert. If p and q are different sentences, then, whatever the logical relation between them, there is simply no logical relation, other than logical consistency, between "S says that p" and "S says that q". They will not be logically inconsistent, and neither logically implies the other. Perhaps the sentence "Silas says that a clown and a pony are there" logically implies "Silas says that a clown is there", but even that is questionable.
Going by logic alone, then, we could not have any reason to treat the denotation of a "that"-clause in an indirect discourse sentence as anything other than an unstructured atom distinct from the denotation of every other "that"-clause in an indirect discourse sentence but not differentiated from those other atoms in any particular way.
Another conception of the task of semantic theory might be that it has to tell us how sentences correspond to reality when they are true. In the case of indirect discourse sentences, then, we would need to identify the sorts of states of affairs in the world that would make an indirect discourse sentence true and try to explain how the elements of the indirect discourse sentence relate to the elements of those states of affairs. For instance, we might think that saying is a three-place relation between speaker, a sentence (or utterance) and a proposition and try to build all three of those into our account of the truth conditions of an indirect discourse sentence. The main problem with this approach is that it presumes that we understand the denotation relation, which supposedly holds
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between words and things (relative to a context), whereas, as a matter of fact, despite a long effort, no one has ever been able to give a plausible and reasonably comprehensive account of what that relation might be.
There is, however, at least one other possible kind of datum that we can put to use in defending a semantics for indirect discourse, namely, the kind of datum that I have employed in this essay concerning the way in which the "that"-clause by means of which we report an act of speech has to differ from the sentence uttered in the act of speech on which we are reporting. For example, from the fact that Emma has to substitute "there"
for "here" when she reports Silas's act of speech in (3), we learn that our semantic account has to say something specifically about the interpretation of "there" as it occurs
in the "that"-clause. In particular, our semantics has to provide for the possibility that the interpretation of "there", as it occurs in the "that"-clause, is identical to the interpretation of "here", as it occurs in Silas's original utterance. And from the fact that we can substitute "everyone who is working on a graphic interface" in the "that"-clause in (8) for the bare "everyone" in Mary's original utterance, we learn that our semantic account has to provide for a domain of discourse for the sentence in the "that"-clause that is potentially distinct from the domain of discourse for the indirect discourse sentence itself.
These sorts of data are special cases of a more general kind of datum that we can appeal to in defending a semantic theory. Roughly speaking, these data have to do with the ways in which we can use language to transmit information. It is not only in indirect discourse that we may be called upon to alter a speaker's own words. We also have to do this when we accept another person's testimony and go to pass it on to someone else.
Instead of telling Dottie what Silas said, Emma might have decided to accept Silas's

Contexts that Point 8/6/09 Page 30
assertion and make the same assertion for herself. However, in that case, she could not have said to Dottie, "Everyone is wearing a funny hat." In that case, she would have had to know enough about the context of Silas's utterance in order to modify it in way that would make clear to Dottie whom she was talking about. So she might have said, "Everyone at Jonas's party is wearing a funny hat". Indeed, indirect discourse might be conceived as a special case of such episodes of information transmission. It is the special case in which the speaker ascribes responsibility for the saying to the previous speaker rather than accept responsibility for it him-or herself. The more general area of concern, which a semantic theory can address, is the ways in which a sentence may or must be transformed when it is grounded in an utterance to which a different context pertains than the context that pertains to the present conversation.
Against a pragmatic theory
In part, our question has been: In what ways may the "that"-clause in an indirect discourse sentence elaborate on the words that the attributee actually spoke? Many people, confronted with this question, would be inclined to answer as follows: We may add to the "that"-clause whatever words we need to add in order to clarify the speaker's meaning. But that, I now wish to argue, while fine as folk linguistics, is a flatly questionbegging answer, if taken as theoretically fundamental.
First of all, not everything a speaker means by what he or she says is something he or she says. So though in saying "It's getting a bit chilly in here, don't you think?"
you may mean that I should get up and close the window, we should not characterize you as having said that I should close the window. Rather, we should say that you implied as indirect discourse sentence, is find words that express that same thought in the new situation that the speaker's own words expressed in his or her own situation.
Thus we are led to the question, how does a speaker manage to express a thought using words, and how do we interpreters manage to express that thought in our own situation? Much contemporary theorizing concerning the nature of linguistic communication unrealistically presupposes that interlocutors have the ability to detect one another's intentions and other states of minds independently of the interpretation of what they say so that they may then appeal to those states of mind in identifying the thoughts that the speaker's words express. I have criticized this presupposition in a number of prior publications (1997, 2001, 2003, 2008) , and I will not rehearse those criticisms here. The moral I draw is that our access to people's thoughts is primarily an understanding of what they say that does not depend on a prior understanding of what 
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If, as I suppose, but have not argued here, the truth of an utterance depends on nothing but the content of the context that pertains to that utterance (as well, of course, on semantic facts concerning the conditions a context must meet in order for the sentence uttered to be true in it), then there is another reason too to suppose that the content of the pertinent context is an objective matter. We think that speaking the truth is something a speaker has to strive to do and can succeed in doing only by taking account of the way the world is around him or her. 
Extending the account to other propositional attitude sentences
The present semantics for indirect discourse does not in any obvious way extend to other sorts of sentences containing "that"-clauses, such as sentences that attribute beliefs. The problem in the case of belief is that when we attribute a belief our attribution may not be grounded in any overt utterance in the way in which an indirect discourse statement may be.
However, in view of the way in which the account of indirect discourse depended on the attributee's having uttered something, I think the obstacles may not be so high. A context, as here defined, assigns to each of a number of people (strictly speaking, to their names) an utterance domain. The utterance domain for a person is a set of sentences. It is not a set of utterances. Actual utterances come into the account only insofar as we
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may expect that in order for a context to be the one that pertains to a given conversation, the sentences in the utterance domain for a speaker must be sentences that that speaker has actually uttered. So similarly, in formulating a semantics for belief sentences, we could suppose that a context assigns to each of the people to whom beliefs can be attributed a set of sentences, the belief set for that person, representing that person's beliefs. In this case, the requirement that a context would have to meet in order for the context to pertain to a given conversation would not be that each of the sentences in the belief set for a person be a sentence that that person actually have uttered, but only that for a certain other relation, the person stand in that relation to each of the sentences in the set.
The big question will be: What is the relation that a person must stand in to each of the sentences in the belief set that a context assigns to that person in order for the context to pertain to a conversation? One possibility would be that each of those sentences is a "direct translation" of a sentence written in the "belief box" in the person's brain. Within this option we could distinguish different theories about the nature of the language of brain writing. (It could be a form of the same language that the believer speaks, or it could be a special kind of mentalese.) More precisely, to allow for inexplicit beliefs, we might say that it is a translation of a logical consequence of sentences written in the belief box. A different possibility would be to say that the sentences in the belief set for a person are sentences that that person would be disposed to speak if he or she were asked to state his or her beliefs and had no fear of retribution or other reason to dissemble. Probably neither of these answers is correct quite as it stands. But they
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perhaps give us hope of being able to formulate a semantics for belief sentences analogous to the present semantics for indirect discourse sentences.
I should emphasize that such an account of the semantics of belief attributions
would not entail analyzing belief as a relation between a person and a sentence. The present approach to the semantics of "believes" does not proceed by analyzing the relation of belief and then assigning that relation to the word "belief" as its denotation.
The de dicto/de re distinction
So far I have not had anything to say about the de dicto/de re distinction, which is usually a large part of what is at issue in philosophical discussions of indirect discourse and attributions of propositional attitudes. Here I will merely state a couple of opinions on the subject without attempting to defend them.
Most philosophers and semanticists (but not all) will grant that the components of "that"-clauses in indirect discourse sentences are normally referentially opaque in the sense that substitution of co-extensional phrases does not preserve truth. However, it is often supposed that there is a special kind of indirect discourse sentence, the de re kind, in which one or more of the components is referentially transparent. So we may regard "S said that a is F" and "a = b" as logically implying "S said that b is F", and in that case, "S said that a is F" is said to be de re, as opposed to de dicto. Moreover, it is often supposed that there is a special syntactic form that can be used to make it explicit that an indirect discourse statement is de re. If we say, "S said of a that it [he/she] is F", then that is supposed to show that the occurrence of "a" is referentially transparent. It does so by placing the referentially transparent term outside of the "that"-clause.
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The first opinion I would like to record is that the de re indirect discourse statement is an entirely fictitious beast. "S said that a is F" and "a = b" never logically imply "S said that b is F", not even when the supposedly dedicated syntax is used. That is, "S said of a that he is F' and "a = b" does not imply "S said of b that he is F'. The "said of a that" locution is merely a device by which we may put the focus on a (as I said in my 2003, pp. 269-70) . Consider the following dialogue:
Mom: Billy said that Santa Claus would bring him a bicycle.
Dad: Billy doesn't think we're giving him a bicycle.
Mom:
No, Billy said of Santa Claus that he would bring him a bicycle.
Mom, in her second statement, clearly is not committing herself to the existence of Santa Claus. She is merely putting the focus on "Santa Claus" in order to emphasize to Dad that it is not they, the parents, who Billy thinks will bring him a bicycle.
Though "S said that a is F" and "a = b" do not logically imply "S said that b is F", there are cases in which we are prepared to accept both "S said that a is F" and "S said that b is F" and in which the truth of "a = b" is part of the reason why both are acceptable. And that fact may be part of the reason why some people believe in the existence of de re indirect discourse statements. The second opinion that I would like to record is that these cases may be treated as cases in which "b is F" is an elevation, in my sense, of "a is F" to the context pertinent to the utterance of "S said that b is F" from the context pertinent to S's utterance of "a is F". What I would need to do next is work out the conditions that a context must meet in order for this elevation relation to hold in it, but I will not try to do that here.
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Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to describe precisely a semantics for a simple language permitting indirect discourse. I will use a sans-serif font both for expressions in the object language and for metalinguistic variables ranging over such expressions. I will "leave it to context", as they say, to distinguish which is which.
Syntax
First, we define a language L without says that and, then, in terms of that, define a language L+ containing says that. The syntax of the language L will be like the usual syntax of the languages of logical studies. Atomic formulae will be formed from predicates and individual variables and singular terms in the usual way. The singular terms of L include here and there. The two-place predicates of L include the identity sign =. Compound formulae will be built up from atomic formulae, negation symbols, disjunction symbols and parentheses in the usual way. However, I will assume that all quantifications have the form: ∀x(F: G), where F and G are formulae of L. Sentences are formulae with no free variables. Every sentence of L is a sentence of L+, and if n is a singular term of L and p is a sentence of L, then n says that p is a sentence of L+.
(Since p has to be a sentence of L, says that will not be embedded under says that.) ( A context Γ = 〈B Γ , N Γ , S Γ , δ Γ , σ Γ 〉, where B Γ , N Γ , S Γ , and δ Γ are defined as before, but σ Γ = a function that assigns to each member of S Γ either a basic context or a context.
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(See figure 1.) (Since says that is never embedded under says that in L+, we could confine our attention to contexts that assign only basic contexts to the names in the speaker domain.)
In order to avoid writing subscripts on subscripts, I will sometimes omit subscripts. Thus it may be understood that B σ(n) is the base of the context that σ Γ assigns to n. 
The elevation relation
The elevation relation is a four-place relation that holds between two sentences and two contexts. We define it in two stages. First, we define several different kinds of elevation,
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one for each modification that may have to be made. Then we define the elevation relation as the product of a sequence of partial elevations.
p is a here-only-elevation of q to Γ from σ Γ (n) if and only if either:
(a) q contains here but not there and p = q, and for some singular term t of L, t = here (or here = t) is a member of both B σ(n) and B Γ , or (b) q contains here but not there and p is the result of substituting there for every occurrence of here in p, and for some singular term t of L, t = here (or here = t) is a member of B σ(n) and t = there (or there = t) is a member of B Γ .
p is a there-only-elevation of q to Γ from σ Γ (n) if and only if either . . . (similarly, but with here and there reversed).
p is a here-and-there-elevation of q to Γ from σ Γ (n) if and only if either:
(a) q contains both here and there, and p = q, and for some singular term t 1 of L, t 1 = here (or here = t 1 ) is a member of both B σ(n) and B Γ , and for some singular term t 2 of L, t 2 = there (or there = t 2 ) is a member of both B σ(n) and B Γ , or (b) q contains here and there and p is the result of simultaneously substituting there for every occurrence of here and here for every occurrence of there in q, and for some singular term t 1 of L, t 1 = here (or here = t 1 ) is a member of B σ(n) and t 1 = there (or there = t 1 ) is a member of B Γ , and for some singular term t 2 of L, t 2 = there (or there = t 2 ) is a member of B σ(n) and t 2 = here (or here = t 2 ) is a member of B Γ . The here-only-, there-only-, and here-and-there-elevations are obligatory elevations, and the quantifier-elevation is an optional elevation. Now we can define the elevation relation for L+ as follows: p is an elevation of q to Γ from σ Γ (n) if and only if there is a sentence s such that (a) either q contains no occurrence of here or there and q = s, or s is an obligatory elevation of q to Γ from σ Γ (n), and (b) either s = p or p is an optional elevation of s. In other words, we obtain an elevation of q to Γ from σ Γ (n) by applying to q whatever obligatory elevation applies and then optionally applying the quantifier-elevation. The definitions are written in such a way that if a sentence contains more than one expression of the form ∀x(F:, then if any one is expanded, then all of them must be expanded.
Contexts that
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For example, ∀x((F & H): R(x, there)) may qualify as an elevation of ∀x(F:
R(x, here)) to Γ from σ Γ (n), because ∀x(F: R(x, there)) may be a here-only-elevation of ∀x(F: R(x, here)) to Γ from σ Γ (n), and ∀x((F & H): R(x, there)) may be a quantifier-elevation of a sentence of the form ∀x(F: R(x, there)) to Γ from σ Γ (n).
Truth conditions
Some sentences will be neither true nor false in some contexts. So we will provide separate formulations of truth and falsehood conditions for sentences of L+.
(T0) If p ∈ B Γ , then p is true in Γ.
(T¬) If p is false in Γ, then ¬p is true in Γ.
(T∨) If p is true in Γ or q is true in Γ, then (p ∨ q) is true in Γ.
(T∀) If, for every n ∈ N Γ such that F[n/x] is true in Γ, G[n/x] is true in Γ, then ∀x(F: G) is true in Γ.
(TID) If for some sentence q ∈ δ Γ (n), p is an elevation of q to Γ from σ Γ (n), then n says that p is true in Γ.
(TCl) No other sentence is true in Γ.
(F0) If ¬p ∈ B Γ , then p is false in Γ.
(F¬) If p is true in Γ, then ¬p is false in Γ.
(F∨) If p is false in Γ and q is false in Γ, then (p ∨ q) is false in Γ.
(F∀) If for some n such that F[n/x] is true in Γ, G[n/x] is false in Γ, then ∀x(F: G) is false in Γ.
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(FID) If for every sentence q ∈ δ Γ (n), p is not an elevation of q to Γ from σ Γ (n), then n said that p is false in Γ.
(FCl) No other sentence is false in Γ.
Note that in (F∀) we might have written "for some n ∈ N Γ ", but in view of the stipulation that N Γ contain every singular term in any member of B Γ , doing so would have been redundant.
